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UWITED STATES
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMEMT AGEHCY

TEST BAN TREATY
Questions and Answers
Why is this k s t bum treaty
to&

#

o m md-

ktmest?

There are

a

number of reasons. This

treaty can:

' act as a deterrent to the spread of nuclear weapons to many additional countries,
thereby lessening the danger of nuclear war;
' drastically reduce or end rhe hamrds of
radioactive fallout;
' have the practiea1 effect of slowing
down the pace of the arms race;
' be a first step toward reduced world
tensions and broader areas of agreement on
the eontrol of nuclear weapons.

What are some of the reasons why the
Soviet UPeiou might Beiiwe this agreemeut to &# h i t s hterest?
Some of the advantages of such an agreement serw the interests of the U.S.S.R. just
as they serve our interests. Continuation of
radioactive fallout is, in the long run, a hazard to the Soviet people as it is to Ameti-

am. The danger that 0th- countries, same
of which may act in atn irresponsible fashion, might a c q u i ~nuclear weapons pwes
a h e a t to the security of both rhe U.S.S.R.
and the United States.
Then there's the matter of economia. An
unrestricted testing program is wry d y .
There is reason to believe the Soviet
Union is aware of these points. There is
also reason to believe that it sees the ameat as serving its inin tbe ideoIogiaI dispute which now pIagues the
C~rnmunisrcamp.

W m the ZiPPeited test Ban agreemeut
reached witboat any strings &achedna secret deds or commifnaents on
other matt&$?
That is correct. Agreement on the test
h a h u e was not linked to agreement on
any other matter.
At the Morrrw negotiations and since
t h t time the United States bas expressed
its wiilingness to consider other means of

reducing tensions and controlling and limiting arms. This reaffirms a position we
have consistently taken.

Wbut kinds of tests are b a w d b y the
agreemmt?
The treaty bans tests in the atmaphere,
in space, and under water, including territorial waters or high seas. Underground
testa are, of course, permitted so long as
they do not spread radioactive debris beyond
rhe territory of the state where they are
mudd.

W h y are udergroz~nd tests mod inclnded h
a the agreememt?
Undergmufid tests are the most dif6,cult
police, because it is not always possible
distiaguisb seismic waves produced by
earthquakes from those mused by nuclear
explosions. Where there is doubt, it is necessary ta conduct on-site inspections at the
location where the event occurred to determine the cause of the tremor. The Soviet
Union bas so far h
a
,
wilIing to accept only
a token number of these inspections, d
Soviet representatives have refused even to
d i m s ways ia which inspections could be
most effectively conducted.
to
to

Are there m y restrbctdms om u ~ d e r groand teskkg?
Any number of underground nudeur explosions, of any size or type, for peaceful
or military purpom, may be carried out m
long as such explosions do not cause radioactive debris to be present outside the terri-

.

torial limits of the country conducting the
explmion.
Fotlowing aa underground explosion it is
not unusual for some radioactive material
to reach the earth's surface through cracks
or fissures in the ground. Such nuclear debris generally remains localized near the
point of detonation. Under the treaty there
wauld be no violation so long as this debris
remained wirhin national borders,

The agreement refers t o a baa on a ~ y
type of auclear explosion m d e r zuuter,
including itmritorki wuters or high
seus. WBd does this mem?
It means that underwater nudear explosions cannot be carried out anywhere in the
oceans, inchding the waters immediately
adjacent to a country's shores. They are
also prohibited in rivers or inland lakes,

Is it tpwe tbat the treaty in no wuy res t r i c t s oar scse of ntrclerw werlfions in
time of wsr?
Yes.

The treaty deaIs with the bestiug of

nuclear wempws, not with their use in time

of war.

Does the $re&y #eve& a party from
g i v h g hfwm&io.tt a d bechnkdi assistawe om t r u c l e ~mddders to otbm
cozcntries?
The treaty prevents signatory states from
"causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in" a nuclear explosion in the
three prohibited environments. This would
not prevent a parry from providing technical
assistance md information so long as it did
not contribute materially to a test or test
series in the prohibited env imnmenrs.

Does the Soviet U&o# krlve a veto
power over ametfdmemts t o the beady?
The three original parties to rhe treatythe United States, the United Kingdom, and
the U.S.S.R-have the power to veto treaty
amendments. Any amendment to be
adopted must be approved by a majority of
all the signatory nations, including all three
of the original parties. Any amendment
that would affect the rights or obligations
of the United Stafes under the treaty would,
of course, be submitted to the Senate for
its advice and consent.

If the United

States, as a Defiosibury
Gover~a~nmt-tht is, one which cam
receive instrumelpis of rrftifiatdon from
other states--were t o accept an iwstrttmeat of ratification from B regime we
do mot mow recog&xe, watcld this sot
constdrdts recopition?

No. Actually the three original parties to
the treat--the United States, the United

Kingdom, and the U . S . S . R . d e the Depositmy Governmenu. If a regime which
one or wen two of the three do not recognize
wishes to adhere to the treaty, its instrument
of ratificationneed be submitted only to that
Depositary Government which does recognize it.

Woddu't tbs U d e d Skstes be cornpelhd to r e c b p k e dl regimes whkb
adhere to the tredy?

No. The fundamentml factor in determining recognition is intent. It is clear in
international law that particiption in a
multilateral treaty with a nonrecognized
regime does nor entail recognition of that
regime.

Does #be fteroby payAde t k rt @ur#y
muy witbdrw if b beldwes i t s security
iMerests #are b e h g thsatmed?
Ymi. The treaty contains a withdrawal
clause which provides that a party may withdraw "if it decides that extmurdinary events,
related m the subject matter of this Treaty,
have jeopardized the supreme intetegts of
its countrytry"Whether its interests are
k i n g jeopardized by a test or a series of
tests is for that sram alone to decide. If it
beliwes this to h the case, it must give 3
months' notice of its intention to withdraw.
The withdrawal provision, with its requirement for 3 months' notice, d m not
restrict the right of a state in international
law m withdraw immediately from the treaty
if there is a pfain violation by another party.

Wbat are #berisks of

sscre# testkg d
s W m wkhd~~wd?

Actually, the danger of clanddne resting
in the prohibited environments-the atmw

phere, space, and under water--is minimal.
In addition m the fact rhat we have generally & verification capabilities in these
environmen~,and ma improve them, there
would be Iittle value in anothei nation's
attempring to carry out in these environments the types of tesa that it could freely
conduct underground
W e will maintain on a standby basis those
testing facilitiesaffectedby the ban. This is
a strong deterrent to any nation which might
conremplate suddenly breaking off the treaty
and testing in the'atmosphere, in space, or
under water.

How wo& w e k m w if a stde were
to violate #be & g r e e d ?
The system for policing the agreement is
really a tecip-1
inspection system-you
@ice me, I police you. The United States
has a detection system for the purpose of
moniroriog nuclmr tmriag by ocher countries. Our present capabilities to detect tests
in the atmosphere and under water are good.

Existing apbilities for space are limited,
but most of the basic instruments r e q u i d
for improvement in this environment have

been developed.
Under the treaty w e wi11 continue to o p
era# our presenr system, and we will also
be free to muke whatever improvements are
n e c e s q in order to assure outselves &at
any signiftnt testing by another country
would be d d .
a M y

Is it possible

to detect tests if tbey are
c o d w d d d k fur oaer space?

The primary concern in space tests anters on tests of severaI megatons or more,
since the smaller t a t s can be conducted
underground.
There is at present a possibility that deep
in outer space iIlepI tests might go undeteaed. But we a l d y haw the capability
to coustruct a detection system that would
& multimegaton rests ia space almast
impossible to conceaI. Any time we determine that there is a need for such a system,
it can be put into operation.

A party contemplaring clandestine tests
in space has more to reckon with than the
possibilities of king caught. Not only is
this resting an extremely expnsive undertaking but it is time-consuming. To obtain
results from a test millions of miles away
could take weeks or months. This problem
is further compounded by a n u m k of other
technical difficulties that would have to be
overcome to gain even limited knowledge
from the explosion.

The Sowkt U ~ i o mb r ~tested
~
kgep
mdtimegatoa wespoas ~sbapzwe have.
From Q rniidary stadpoint, rzrm't we
going ;No this treaty ab a d i s d u d a g e ?
W e already haw in our stockpile a large
number of nuclear weapons with dzereot
amounts of explosive power. These a n be
wed for a variety of strategic or tactical
purposes. W e also have s number of d i k enr sophisticated systems for delivery of our
nuclear weapons. Our present nuclear arsenal, combined with our conventional

-

permics us to respond in a W b l e
manner and in a number of di8erenr ways
to any oven act of aggression.
It is true that the Soviefs have tested nuwapoag of a yield higher than w e
have. But we have not explded or d m l oped weapons in this range of very high
yield because we do nor believe them
newsmy for our security. By choice we
have concentrated on efficient weapons that
have a lesser but sdicient yield. W e be£0-

lieve that lesser yields combined wirh large
numbers of bard or mobile delivery systems
provide the United States wirh greater
writy.
In these c h m s m m s it is dear that we
are nor at a disadvantage in terms of nuclear
weapons development.

Wbrxt about d e v e o m of as amti6rldIistic missile? Do#'# ~ U Bw e d fw#bm tests in the dtaosphere to deterlrPiw tbe feasibiIay of s ~ c ba system?
Further nudear tests will not solw cercaia basic problems which we
in de-

velopment of the anti-ballistic m i s s i l e
(ABM). First, any ABM defense is susceptible to saturation-eemy missiles launched
in such quantities ua to overwhelm the defensive missiles. Secondly, decays or missiles with dummy warheads, launched along
with the real missiles, could lead the defensive missiles astray.
Since there is stiU a question as to tbe
effectivenessof the ABM, no decision to date
has been made as to whether we should
deploy such a system.

W e m e e v d e d y a b e d of the Sovie#
U ~ w iPP
n the deuelo#mspat of tactical
paucZear weupom. U d e r the treaty,
ptwtks B T ~free t o #est ~ t m g ~ o ~ ~ w
where math CWPZ 84 dam t o devekop

these weupom. Does#'# this give the
Soviet Uawn un opporbumity to c b
up in tbis area?
Since underground wting is permissible
under the treaty, we m match the U.S.S.R.

twt-for-in this area if need be. The
United States has thus far had more experience in undergmund testing than the Sovim. h the a h m e of any test ban the
xace at which the Soviet Union could develop its aacciaal weapons would certainly
be grearer since it could then test in aU
environmen~without limitation.

Supfiose Prawe OP Compreu~isbC b k
tests h the prob*&ed aawonmm#s.
How tuorrld dkis a#ect tbe agreement?
What action, if any, a party to the trmty
might take in this event would depend on
the cirmmsmnm at the time. In any mse,
should a signatory state consider its national
security seriously jeopardized by w i n g by
others, it would l
x free to withdraw fern
the agreement.
With this treaty in &st,t h e wouId certainly be greater pmsum on Prance and
Gommunist China to dsist from any testing
program than would exist in the a h s e e of
an agreement. And regardless of wbut

Communist China and France may do, there
is the fact that n number of other d n i c a l l y
sbk countries have already signed the treaty.
This alone represents a signific~uttgain t ~ ward halting the s p r d of nuclear weapons
to many countries.

reai danger that with #his
agreement C b u d we may now feei we
cam relax oar g k r d against fut"tker
&ternfits by the Commacpu'sts to m-

Z s ~ l ' t $here a

moucb wr free-wmid nathm?
danger we face.
This may be the
It would be a great mistake to wume
that, bemuse the Soviet Union is a party to
this limited test ban agreement, the millennium has arrived.
The Communists have in no way renounced their avowed objective of -hi
domination even though the Soviet Union
may use means other than nudear war w
achieve it. While we must continue earnestly to seek further arrangementsdesigned
to reduce international tensionti and limit

-

and control ttrmaments, we m m not so relax
our guard as to invite aggression.

How does the &eaty &ec# the Atomic
Emwgy Conzmissio~~'~
Plozvsbare @YOgram for peaxefd uses of ratomzk
el~ergy?
m
i
a
h of the Atomic Energy Commission say that the treaty will not prevent
development of device for upe in Plowshm
nor will it seriously inhibit scientific projects, or mining or remurce development
projecrs, which can be wried out deep underground. On tbe other hand, the treaty's
&=t
on the excavation program will depend on rhe location of the spec& excavation. An explosion could not be carried
out if it would cause radiwtive debris to
be p m t outside the territorial limits of
the cumtry involved.

Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere,
in Outer Space and Under Water
The Governments of the United States of
America, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereiaafter referred to as the "Original Parties",
Proclaiming as their principal d m the
speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament
under strict international mnmI in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the
armaments race and eliminate the incentive
to the production and testing of dl kinds
of fReaponq including nucleou weapons,
Seeking ro achieve the discontinuance of
all test explrwions of nuclear weapons for all
time, determined to continue negotiationsto
tbis end, and desiring to put an end to the

contamination of man's environment by
radimive m h e e a ,
Haw agreed ao foIlows:
Article I
I. Each of the Parries to this Treaty under&
to prohibit, to prevent, and not to
carry out any nuclear weapon &st expIosion,
or any other nuclear explosion, at any place
under its jurisdiction or control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits,
iucluding outer space; or derwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioacrive debris m k
present outside the territorial limits of the
State under whose jurisdiction .or control
such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions
of this subparagraph are without prejudice
to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the
permanent banning of d l nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the
Parties have stated in the Preamble to this
Treaty, they seek to achieve.
2. Each of the Parties oo this Tmty
undertakes furthermore to refrain from

causing, encouraging, or in m y way participating in, the carrying out of any nudew
weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear
explosion, mywhere which wouId take
place ia any of the environments described,
or have the dm referred to,in paragraph 1
of this Article.
1. Any Patty may propose amendments to
this Treaty. The text of any pro@
amendment shall h-submitted to the Depsimry Governments which shall drmlate
it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter,
if ~ t e to do
d so by one-third or mare of
the Parties, the Depitary Governments
shall convene a conference, to which they
sbdl invite all the Parties, to wnsider s u c h
amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty rust k
approved by a majority of the votes of dI
the Parties to this Treaty, including the w ~ e s
of a11 of the Original Parties. The amendment shalI enter into force for all Parties
upon the deposit of instruments of r a t i b tion by a majority of all &e P d e s , including the instruments of ratification of all of
the Original Parties.

A&k

I11

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States
for signature. Any State which d a not
sign this Treaty before its entry into force in
accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article
may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shaIJ be subje~rto ratification by signatory Stares. Instrumen# of
rolti6catiw and instruments of accession s h d
be depited 4 t h the Governments of the
Original P m w t h e United States of
America, the United Kingdom of Great
Brirain and Northern Ireland, and the Union
of Soviet M
t Republi-which
are
hereby designated the D q d t t u y Governmenu.
3. This T-y shall enter into foree after
its r a t i f h h by all the O r i g i d par ti^ and
the d e p i t of their imtruments of ratification.

4. For Seam wh- i n ~ f r u m e nof
~ ratification or eaession are depiped s u b
quent to the wtry into force of this Treaty,
it W enter into fom on the date of rhe
depdt d their instruments of rati6cation
or5. The fipositary Governments shal1
px~mptlyinform all signatory and d i n g

States of the date of each signature, the date
of deposit of emh instrument of ratification
of and accession to this Treaty, the date of
its entry inm force, and the date of recleipt
of any requests for conferen- or other

notices.

6. This Treaty shall k registered by the
Depitary Governmentsp-t
to Article
102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
This Treaty shall be of udimioed duration.
Each Party s h a in exercising its national
sovereignty have the right to withdraw from
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events, related to the subject matter of tbis
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shaII give notice of
such withdrawal to all other Parties to the
Treaty three months in advance.
Artick V
This Treaty, of which the English d
Russian tern are equally authentic, shall be
deposited in the archives of the D e p i w
Governments. Duly cerdfied copies of this
Treaty &all be t r a n s m i d by the Depos-

i m y Goer-ts
to the Governments of
the signatory and d i n g Sates.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned,
duly authorimd, have signed this Treaty.
Dom in triplicate at the city of Moscow,
the fifth day of August, one thousand nine
hundred and sw-h.
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